



W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER R   N NO O. .   2 25 52 2 
 
Transaction Costs and the Asymmetric  
Price Impact of Block Trades 
 
Alex Frino and Maria Grazia Romano  
 
 
June  2010  








University of Naples Federico II 
 
University of Salerno 
 
Bocconi University, Milan 
CSEF - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS – UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES 
80126  NAPLES - ITALY 
Tel. and fax +39 081 675372 – e-mail: csef@unisa.it  
 
 




Transaction Costs and the Asymmetric  











The article examines the impact of transaction costs on the trading strategy of informed institutional investors in a sequential 
trading market where traders can choose to transact a large or a small amounts of stock. The analysis shows how the trading 
strategy of informed investors and the price impact of their trades depends on market conditions. The main prediction of the 
model is that institutional buyers are, on average, more aggressive than institutional sellers in bearish markets and less 
aggressive in bullish markets. Hence, the price impact is higher for purchases when market conditions are bearish, while it is 
higher for sales when market conditions are bullish. However, this asymmetry vanishes during strongly bearish or bullish 
phases, when information-based orders stop because the informational advantage of institutional investors becomes too 
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Over the past few decades, the importance of block trading in common stocks
has increased signicantly.1 Extant empirical literature shows that block trades
have a large and persistent impact on stock prices. Theoretical rationale for this
behaviour are liquidity2 and information3 eects resulting from the execution of
large orders. However, an important body of empirical work has documented an
interesting "puzzle" which is dicult to explain using extant theoretical models.
Buyer and seller initiated block trades seem to inuence stock prices dierently.
Chan and Lakonishok [4] analyze the price behavior around institutional trans-
actions for securities listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges
during the period 1986 to 1988. They nd that institutional purchases have
a larger permanent price impact than sales. Gemmill [6] documents a simi-
lar asymmetric price impact for block trades executed on the London Stock
Exchange between 1987 and 1992. Again, Aitken and Frino [1] examine the
determinants of transaction costs associated with institutional trades on the
Australian Stock Exchange between 1991 and 1993. Their results also conrm
that the permanent price eect is larger for buyer than seller initiated block
trades. The more widely accepted explanation is based on the common belief
that purchases are more informative than sales. A rationale behind this expla-
nation is that institutional traders can choose among many potential assets to
buy but usually they sell only those assets that are already in their portfolio
because of restrictions on short sales. Therefore, sales are not necessarily driven
by negative information.4
This paper aims to contribute to this research area by developing a the-
oretical model which explains the price impact asymmetry of block trades in
nancial markets with asymmetric information, sequential trading, competitive
price mechanisms and transaction costs increasing in trade size.5
For this purpose, we develop a sequential trading model where traders are
allowed to transact dierent trade sizes. The ability to transact orders for large
or small quantities introduces a strategic element in the trading game. Traders
rst observe the price schedule and then choose their optimal trading strategy.
If risk neutral informed traders wish to trade, they prefer to trade a larger
amount at any given price. Consequently, the market maker sets a greater
spread for larger trades in every equilibrium with information based trading.
1In June 2008, the New York Stock Exchange executed over 500 million daily
shares of block volume on average, representing 17 percent of total NYSE volume
(www:nyse:com=pdfs=5672{Block{Trading:pdf); in 2004, over 50 percent of total FTSE 100
trading volume was executed in parcels of more than 10,000 shares (Gregoriou [8]).
2See Ho and Stoll [9], and Stoll [14].
3See Easley and O'Hara [5], and Seppi [13].
4This explanation appears in Keim and Madhavan [10]. Saar [12] develops a theoretical
model to show how the trading strategy of institutional investors produces a dierence between
the information content of buy and sell orders that generates the asymmetric price impact.
5Our model diers from Saar [12] in that we analyze the trading strategy of risk neutral
informed traders in a market for only one asset, while in Saar informed traders are assumed
to hold diversied portfolios consisting of many assets, are prevented from concentrating their
holding in only a few assets and are adverse to short selling.
1The crucial assumption is that traders bear an exogenous cost in transacting
which is increasing in trade size. This cost gives informed traders an incentive to
transact the small, rather than the large quantity, and can lead to a no-trading
informational cascade, which is a situation where all informed traders choose to
refrain from trading, regardless of their private signal. 6
We show that, if transaction costs are suciently low and the market width
(the distance between the large and the small trade size) is suciently large,
three types of equilibria can arise depending on underlying market conditions.
If transaction costs exceed the informational prot of traders observing private
signals about the true asset value, all informed traders prefer to refrain from
trading and orders do not convey any information about fundamental value.
If the informational advantage of traders is large enough with respect to the
average transaction cost, either a separating or a pooling equilibrium can arise,
depending on the market width. In a separating equilibrium, informed traders
place only large orders. Hence, small orders are uninformative and the spread for
small quantities only reects exogenous transaction costs. This outcome occurs
if the dierence between the size of large and small orders is suciently large.
Finally, if the market width is not large enough a pooling equilibrium prevails.
In this equilibrium, informed traders trade both large and small amounts. The
large trade spread reduces with respect to the separating equilibrium, whereas
the spread for small quantities increases because of information costs.
The information content of large orders reaches a maximum in the separat-
ing equilibrium. It reduces when a pooling equilibrium prevails in the market
and tends to zero in a no-trading equilibrium, as an informational cascade devel-
ops. Moreover, trading volume is shown to gradually decrease before a cascade
occurs, and reaches a minimum as the cascade develops.
Our analysis also shows that the informational advantage of traders is high
when there is extreme uncertainty about the asset's fundamental value and de-
creases as the public belief converges on the low or on the high asset value. Since
the asset's price is positively related to public belief, a no trading equilibrium
can prevail both in a strongly bearish and in a strongly bullish market, where
the informational prot of traders is lower than transaction costs, whilst a sep-
arating or a pooling equilibrium can prevail in a at market or when market
conditions are weakly bearish or bullish.
Finally, in our model, contrarian signals are more valuable than conrming
signals. Indeed, traders getting an adverse signal on the true asset value have
a larger informational advantage than traders getting a favorable signal if the
market is in a bullish phase and lower informational advantage if the market
is in a bearish phase. We show that this yields several interesting empirical
6More generally, an informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for individuals, after
observing the actions of previous agents, to ignore their own information and mimic the
decisions of their predecessors. Informational cascades rst appeared in Banerjee [2] and
in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [3]. Banerjee [2] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch [3] independently show in dierent settings that informational cascades (or "herding",
in Banerjee's terminology) eventually occurs with certainty. The result that trading costs lead
to informational cascades in nancial markets is due to Lee [11].
2implications. First, large information based buy orders are more numerous
than large information based sell orders in a bearish market and less numerous
in a bullish market. Second, buys have a greater price impact than sells during
a bearish phase and lower price impact during a bullish phase. Finally, in a
neutral market the model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the price
impact asymmetry - dened as the the dierence between the absolute value of
the price impact of a large buy and of a large sell order - and the asset price. In
a strongly bearish market the price impact asymmetry is increasing in the asset
price. In a strongly bullish market it is decreasing in the asset price.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe
the model. In section 3 we dene and derive equilibrium conditions and discuss
the impact of transaction costs on the learning process. In Section 4 we examine
the asymmetric price impact of block trades in bearish and bullish markets.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs of propositions are in the appendix.
2 The Economy
We consider a sequential trading model analogous to Glosten and Milgrom [7],
and modied to account for transaction costs and dierent trade sizes.7
The market is for a risky asset which is exchanged among a sequence of risk
neutral traders and competitive market makers who are responsible for quoting
prices. The value e V of the asset can be low (e V = V ) or high (e V = V ). The
ex-ante probability of e V = V is 0 2 (0; 1). To simplify the analysis we assume,
without loss of generality, V = 0 and V = 1.
Trades occur sequentially, with one trader allowed to transact at any point
in time. The trader whose turn it is to transact may either buy a small or a
large quantity, or sell a small or a large quantity, or refrain from trading.8
We denote order size using QS and QL for small and large orders, respectively
(hence QS < QL). A  fSQL; SQS; BQS; BQL; NTg is the traders' action
space, with SQi and BQi indicating, respectively, a sell and a buy order for
quantity Qi, with i = S;L, and NT indicating an order of zero volume.
There are two types of traders: liquidity traders (fraction 1 ) and informed
traders (fraction ). To simplify the analysis, we assume that liquidity traders
choose to submit large or small sell and buy orders and to refrain from trading
with equal probability 1=5. We denote the probability that an uninformed trader
submits a given order as  
1 
5 .9
Informed traders privately observe a signal  correlated with the asset value.
The set of private signals is  = f;g; the signal  indicates V and the signal
7The approach taken involves a sequential trade model similar to that of Easley and O'Hara
[5].
8The two tradable sizes can be interpreted as two markets: one market for small orders
and one for large orders.
9For simplicity we assume that the behavior of liquidity traders does not depend on trans-
action costs. However, the more realistic assumption that the probability of no trade is an
increasing function of transaction costs does not aect the qualitative results of the paper.
3 indicates V . We assume that signals are symmetric and let p = Pr(jV ) =
Pr(jV ) > 1
2. We denote the likelihood ratio of signals by .
The expected asset value of an informed trader at time t is denoted by
Et[e V j ] and the market maker's expectation is Et[e V ]. Finally, we denote the
probability that the market maker attaches to V at time t by t.10
Before a trader arrives, the market maker sets bid and ask prices at which he
is willing to trade each asset quantity. Finally, we assume that market making
is costly and traders pay a fee c(Q) to transact quantity Q 2 fQS; QLg. We
also assume that c(QS)  c(QL) and AC(QS)  AC(QL), where AC(Qi) 
c(Qi)=Qi is the average cost to trade quantity Qi.
3 Equilibrium Strategies and Prices
At the beginning of any trading round t, the market maker sets competitive
quote prices. We denote the price schedule at time t by Pt. Clearly:
Pt = fBL;t; BS;t; AS;t; AL;t g;
where BL;t is the bid price for a large quantity, BS;t the bid price for a small
quantity, AS;t the ask price for a small quantity, and AL;t the ask price for a
large quantity.
After prices are set, a trader is randomly selected to trade, observes the
price schedule and executes his strategy. If the selected trader is a liquidity
trader, he acts in an ex-ante specied probabilistic way. If the selected trader
is informed, he chooses the strategy which maximizes his expected prot given
the price schedule and the transaction fee.
The market maker anticipates the strategies of informed traders and an-
nounces his price schedule. Bertrand competition restricts the market maker to
earn zero expected prot from each trade. Hence, the trader arriving at t faces
a price schedule which satises:
Bi;t = Et[e V jSQi] 8i 2 fS; Lg
Ai;t = Et[e V jBQi] 8i 2 fS; Lg:
(1)
Since Et[e V j]  Et[e V ]  Et[e V j] for any t and bid and ask prices are
included between Et[e V j] and Et[e V j], traders observing a good signal never
prefer to sell the asset and traders with a bad signal never prefer to buy the
asset. Thus, by the assumption of competitive market making, it follows that in
equilibrium, bid and ask prices always straddle the unconditional expected asset
value Et[e V ] and are included between Et[e V j] and Et[e V j]. Depending on the
10Since V = 0 and V = 1, Et[e V ] = t. Moreover, by the Bayes rule:
Et[e V j ] =
t




which exceeds Et[e V ] if  = , and which is lower than Et[e V ] if  = .
4parameters of the model, dierent outcomes may prevail. If informed traders
prefer to trade only a large quantity, they are separated from small liquidity
traders. We call this a separating equilibrium. If informed traders submit either
small or large orders with positive probability, a pooling equilibrium occurs. If
they prefer to refrain from trading, a no trading equilibrium occurs. Finally, if
they are indierent between submitting an order and refraining from trading, a
pooling equilibrium with no trading arises.
It is useful to note that the equilibrium on one side of the market may
dier from the equilibrium on the other side. For example, traders observing 
may prefer to sell only large quantities and traders observing  may choose to
buy, with positive probability, either small or large quantities. In the following
sections we analyze in more detail the dierent outcomes that can occur in
equilibrium.
3.1 The no-trading equilibrium
In the no-trading equilibrium, no sell or buy order arises from informed traders.
Since transactions are not information based, they do not aect the market










L = E[e V ]
Dene ne
 ()  jE[e V j] E[e V ]j as the informational advantage of a trader
observing  who does not submit any order. Pne is an equilibrium price schedule
when the expected prot from informed trading is strictly negative. Since the
average cost is decreasing in Q (by assumption), the condition for a no-buying
equilibrium to prevail is ne
 () < AC(QL) and the condition for a no-selling
equilibrium is ne
 () < AC(QL).
The following Proposition summarizes conditions for the occurrence of a
no-trading equilibrium on the bid and on the ask side of market.
Proposition 1 For the bid side of the market a no-trading equilibrium prevails
if  2 [0;;S] [ [;S;1], with ne
 (;S) = ne
 (;S) = AC(QL) and ;S 
;S. Similarly, for the ask side of the market a no-trading equilibrium prevails
if:  2 [0;;S] [ [;S;1], with ne
 (;S) = ne
 (;S) = AC(QL) and ;S 
;S.
Proof See Appendix.
Prices are positively related to the market maker's assessment of the fun-
damental asset value, . A high  leads to high prices and low  implies low
prices. Moreover, if a trade occurs at time t 1, the public belief about the asset
value at time t, t, is equal to the transaction price at t 1. Thus, Proposition 1
states that informed traders choose to refrain from trading when the asset price
is particularly low or high because, in those cases, their informational advantage











































0 ;S ;S ;S ;S
Figure 1: The no-trading equilibrium.
E[V j] E[V ] represents the informational advantage of a trader who receives a good
signal, as a function of the probability of V , ; while E[V j]   E[V ] represents the
informational advantage of a trader who receives a bad signal. As  becomes larger
than ;S or smaller than ;S the average transaction cost AC(QL) overcomes the
informational prot of all traders, resulting in a no trading equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If  > 1=2, then a no trading equilibrium for the bid side of
the market implies a no trading equilibrium for the ask side of the market. If
 < 1=2, the reverse is true.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that in a bull market traders with good news refrain
from trading more often than traders with bad news and the reverse arises in a
bear market.
To gain some intuition into these results, consider the limiting case of perfect
signals (p = 1), and suppose that e V = V = 1. Since signals are perfect,
the expected asset value of informed traders is always 1, whatever the public
belief. The traders' informational advantage is equal to (1   ). It is low if the
probability the market maker attaches to V , and thus also the asset price, is
high, and it grows as this probability approaches 0. The more the valuation of
the market diers from 1, the higher the transaction cost that informed traders
are willing to pay in order to transact.
In a similar way, when signals are not perfect (p < 1), the informational
advantage of a trader observing  is low if the public belief is consistent with
, because the asset price approaches the trader's expectation, and it grows
6as the valuation of the market maker moves in the opposite direction. But,
unlike the case for perfect signals, the trader's informational advantage decreases
also when the market maker attaches a very low probability to the asset value
consistent with . This occurs because, when signals are not perfect, the trader's
expectation depends not only on his private signal, but also on public beliefs.
If the past history of trades strictly implies an asset value inconsistent with ,
a trader observing this signal attaches a low weight to his private information
with respect to the public belief. Hence, when the market attaches a greater
probability to V ( < 1
2), the informational advantage of traders observing 
is greater than that of traders observing ; when the market attaches a greater
probability to V ( > 1
2), the reverse is true (see Figure 1). As a consequence,
when prices are low( < ;S), the no trading equilibrium for the ask side of
market implies the no trading equilibrium also in the bid side and the converse
is true when prices are high ( > ;S).
To conclude, it is interesting to note that in a no-trading equilibrium no new
information reaches the market because all informed traders choose to refrain
from trading. Therefore, the economy is in an informational cascade.
3.2 The separating equilibrium
A separating equilibrium prevails in a market when the competitive price sched-




L g, is such that informed traders place only large
orders. Thus, small trades are not information-based and do not aect the
public belief about the true asset value, while the information content of large
trades is very strong.




and the equilibrium price of large orders is given by:
Bse
L = =( + (1   )se
SQL)
Ase
L = =( + (1   )se
BQL);
where se
SQL  ( +p)=( +(1 p)) and se
BQL  ( +(1 p))=( +p) are,
respectively, the likelihood ratio of a large sell and of a large buy order. 11.
A separating equilibrium prevails only if, given the price schedule Pse, in-
formed traders prefer to trade large quantities. This occurs when the expected
prot from trading in size is strictly positive, and the prot due to the larger
quantity exceeds the better price available for small trades.
To gain some intuition, dene se
 ()  E[e V j]   Ase
L as the informational
advantage of a trader observing  in a separating equilibrium and se
 () 
11Clearly, se
SQL > 1 because a large sell order can be submitted either by a liquidity trader
or by an informed trader observing , and  > 1, while se
BQL < 1 because a large buy order
can be submitted either by a liquidity trader or by an informed trader observing , and  < 1
7Bse
L   E[e V j] the informational advantage of a trader observing . Suppose
that the expected prot from trading large is strictly positive, that is: se
 () 
AC(QL) for any  2 [;], and consider the ask side of the market. The dier-
ence between the expected prot from buying the large and the small quantity
can be written as follows:
() = [se
 ()   AC(QL))](QL   QS)+
 [(Ase
L   Ase
S )   (AC(QS)   AC(QL))]QS:
(2)
The rst term represents the expected gain due to the greater quantity of asset
bought and the second term is the loss due to the higher price paid to purchase
the rst QS units of the asset. An informed trader endowed with  chooses to
place a large order if this dierence is positive. It is interesting to note that
transaction costs have two eects on condition (2). On the one hand, they reduce
the benet of buying a large quantity because they make transactions more
expensive.12 On the other hand, they reduce incentives to buy a small quantity
because of the gain due to the lower transaction cost borne from purchasing
the rst QS units of asset.13 It is easy to verify that, if transaction costs
are increasing in the trade size, then the rst eect prevails over the second
one. Hence, transaction costs reduce the likelihood of a separating equilibrium,
despite the assumption of decreasing average costs and even in the limit where
they are constant.
The separating equilibrium is more likely to prevail when the distance be-
tween the large and the small quantity is greater. A larger QL and a lower QS
have both a direct positive eect on the aptitude to trade large and an indirect
positive eect through average costs. Indeed, an increase in the large quantity
yields a reduction in AC(QL) and an increase in the distance between QL and
QS produces a larger dierence in average costs. Finally, if the fraction of liq-
uidity traders is small, the information that the market maker can infer from a
large order is very accurate (se
SQL is close to ). This, in turn, implies that
the dierence between Bse
S and Bse
L and the dierence between Ase
L and Ase
S are
signicant and hence the loss due to the worse prices in trading QL rather than
QS are high. Hence, QL has to be very large with respect to QS in order to
encourage informed traders to separate from small liquidity traders.
Since we are interested in studying block trades, in the following we will









. This condition guarantees that a sep-
arating equilibrium would always prevail in the absence of transaction costs.14
It simplies the analysis but it is not needed to obtain the results of the propo-
sitions that follows.
The next Proposition summarizes conditions for the occurrence of a sepa-
rating equilibrium for the bid and for the ask side of the market.
12Transaction costs are assumed to be increasing in trade size.
13This eect is due to the assumption of decreasing average costs.
14This statement is proved in the Appendix.
8Lemma 1 For any  2 [;], se
 ()  AC(QL) if and only if  2 [;L;;L],
with ;L and ;L such that: i) se
 (;L) = se
 (;L) = AC(QL) and ii)
;L  ;L.
Proposition 3 A separating equilibrium prevails for the bid side of the market
if: i)  2 [;L;;L] and ii) ()  0. Similarly, a separating equilibrium
prevails for the ask side of the market if: i)  2 [;L;;L] and ii) ()  0.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 3 points out that a separating equilibrium never occurs if the
asset price is particularly low or high because, in those cases, the transaction
costs are higher than the informational advantage of traders. Moreover, in
bull markets traders with a bad signal have a larger informational advantage,
whilst the informational advantage of traders with a good signal is larger in
bear markets. This implies that when prices are high, a separating equilibrium
is more likely to prevail for the bid side of the market, while the reverse occurs
when prices are low. This result follows from the next proposition.
Proposition 4 If  > 1=2, then the separating equilibrium for the ask side of
the market implies the separating equilibrium for the bid side of the market. If
 < 1=2, the reverse is true.
Proof See Appendix.
3.3 The pooling equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium traders observing  choose to play a mixed strategy
  f;S;;L;;NTg dened on the simplex (SQS;SQL; NT) and traders
observing  choose to play a mixed strategy   f;S;;L;;NTg dened on
the simplex (BQS;BQL; NT).
A pooling equilibrium where informed traders submit both small and large
orders (;S > 0 and ;L > 0) prevails when the informational advantage
of traders observing  exceeds the highest average transaction cost, that is:
ne
 () > AC(QS), but it is not large enough to induce informed traders to
separate from small liquidity traders, that is: () < 0.








L g to describe
a pooling equilibrium with both small and large information based orders, in-




L   E[e V j])QL   c(QL) = (B
pe
S   E[e V j])QS   c(QS)  0 (3)
(E[e V j]   A
pc
L )QL   c(QL) = (E[e V j]   A
pc
S )QS   c(QS)  0: (4)
It is easy to see that if BL > BS, traders endowed with  never choose to
sell a small quantity and if AL < AS, traders observing  never buy a small









S . This, in turn, implies that in a pooling
equilibrium informed traders are more likely to place a large order.
Finally, a pooling equilibrium without small information based orders (;S =
0) prevails when i) the average transaction cost for the small quantity is too
large with respect to the traders' informational advantage, that is: ne
 () 
AC(QS), and ii) the average transaction cost for the large quantity is below the
traders' informational advantage, but is too large to induce traders to submit
large orders with probability 1, that is: ne
 () > AC(QL)  se
 ().
The next proposition states that in a bull (bear) market where a pooling
equilibrium prevails both for the ask and bid side, informed sellers are more
(less) aggressive than informed buyers.
Proposition 5 If  > 1=2 and a pooling equilibrium prevails in both sides of
the market, then the probability of observing a large information based sell order
is greater than the probability of observing a large information based buy order.
If  < 1=2, the reverse is true.
Proof See Appendix.
4 The asymmetric price impact of large trades
The price impact of a large trade in our model is the change in the public belief
about the value of the asset due to the large order. It depends both on the
orders information content and on the weight the market maker attaches to this
information. Since traders observing a good signal never sell and those observing
a bad signal never buy, the price impact of a large sell is always negative and
the price impact of a large buy is always positive. In the following we will focus
on the magnitude of the price impact.
The information content of an order is related to its likelihood ratio. If an
order is totally uninformative about the true value of the asset then its likelihood
ratio is equal to 1; the more informative the order is, the more its likelihood ratio
diers from 1. More specically, the more informative is a sell order, the more
its likelihood ratio is higher than 1 and the more informative is a buy order,
the more its likelihood ratio is lower than 1. So we can dene the information
content of a large sell order as its likelihood ratio and the information content
of a large buy order as the reciprocal of its likelihood ratio.
Given the unconditional public belief , the price impact of a large sell order
is:
S()  jBL   j =
 (1   )(SQL()   1)
 + (1   )SQL()
;
where SQL()  Pr(SQLj;V )nPr(SQLj;V ) is the equilibrium information
content of a large sell order, conditional on the public belief , and the price
10impact of a large buy order is:
B()  jAL   j =
 (1   )(1   BQL())
 + (1   )BQL()
;
where 1=BQL()  Pr(BQLj;V )nPr(BQLj;V ) is the equilibrium informa-
tion content of a large buy order, conditional on .
Let the price impact asymmetry expression of the asset be dened as:
J()  B()   S():
J() is larger than, equal to, or lower than 0 if and only if the price impact of a
large buy order is, respectively, larger than, equal to, or lower than the impact
of a large sell order.
The public belief about an asset value captures the equilibrium price prior
to the large trade. The minimum and the maximum value the asset price can
achieve in equilibrium are respectively 0 and 1. Hence, a at market is charac-
terized by  = 1n2  0, a bullish market is characterized by  > 1n2 and a
bearish market by  < 1n2. 15 This leads to the following result.
Proposition 6 In a at market the price impact of a large sell order is equal to
the price impact of a large buy order. In a bullish market the price impact of a
large sell order is larger than the price impact of a large buy order. In a bearish
market the price impact of a large buy order is larger than the price impact of
a large sell order.
Proof See Appendix.
The rationale for the results in Proposition 6 is that the informational ad-
vantage of traders observing a signal contrary to the price path, that is, a good
signal in a bear market or a bad signal in a bullish market, is larger and induces
them to be more aggressive.
Because of exogenous transaction costs, when prices are very low or very
high, an informational cascade develops and orders do not have any impact on
prices.
In order to study the correlation between the price impact asymmetry and
market conditions we will analyze the price impact asymmetry under 4 dierent
market conditions. Depending on the public belief about the true value of the
asset, , we distinguish between strong and weak bearish and bullish markets.
A strong bearish market (SBear) is characterized by  ! 0; a weak bearish
market (WBear) is characterized by  ! 1n2 and  < 1n2; a strong bullish
market (SBull) is characterized by  ! 1; a weak bullish market (WBull) is
characterized by  ! 1n2 and  > 1n2; a neutral market is characterized by
 2 (1n2   ; 1n2 + ), with  > 0 and small enough. Finally, we dene the
asymmetry in the price impact by jJ()j.
15Observe that the price in the at market is the average between 0 and 1.
11Proposition 7 In a weak bear market the asymmetry in the price impact in-
creases as the asset price decreases. In a weak bull market the asymmetry in
the price impact increases as the asset price increases.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 8 In a strong bear market the price impact asymmetry decreases
as the asset price decreases. In a strong bull market the price impact asymmetry
decreases as the asset price increases.
Proof See Appendix.
Propositions 7 and 8 state a non-monotone relationship between the price
impact asymmetry and the asset price. Indeed, in a strong bearish market the
price impact asymmetry is increasing in the asset price; in a neutral market
the relationship between the price impact asymmetry and the asset price is U-
shaped; in a strong bullish market the relationship becomes decreasing. The
intuition for this result is the following. In a at market ( = 1=2) the price
impact of a large sell order is equal to the price impact of a large buy order.
If the asset price increases (reduces), the informational advantage of traders
observing the bad news increases (decreases), while that of traders observing the
good news decreases (increases). As a consequence, traders with a bad signal
become more (less) aggressive and traders with the good signal less (more).
This implies that the price impact asymmetry goes up as the asset price moves
away from 1=2. However, since signals are imperfect, if the asset price increases
(decreases) signicantly, the history of trades strictly indicates the high (low)
asset value and traders observing the bad (good) news attach to their signal a
lower weight than to the public belief. As a consequence, also their informational
advantage reduces and they become less aggressive. Thus, the price impact
asymmetry decreases when prices become too high or too low and vanishes as
an informational cascade develops.
5 Comments and concluding remarks
In this paper we examine the impact of trading costs increasing in order size
on price discovery. We show that a no-trading informational cascade develops
when market conditions are strongly bearish or bullish (that is, when the asset
price is extremely high or low) and, then, the transaction costs exceed the
informational prot of traders endowed with private information. Otherwise, in
a weakly bearish or bullish market, the informational prot is suciently large
with respect to transaction costs and two equilibria can arise: a separating
equilibrium, where informed traders choose to trade only the large quantity,
and a pooling equilibrium, where informed traders choose to submit both large
and small orders with positive probability. In the separating equilibrium the
spread at the large quantity exceeds the spread at the small quantity. Hence,
12this outcome prevails if the large quantity is big enough to oset the better price
for small orders.
The main insight that comes out of the analysis is the relation between
market conditions and the empirically well documented price impact asymmetry.
In the model, the price impact of a large trade corresponds to the change in the
market's expectations about the true asset value due to the arrival of a large
order. In bearish markets large buys have, on average, greater price impact
than large sells, while in bullish markets the exact opposite occurs. Moreover,
the asymmetry increases in absolute value during a weakly bearish or bullish
phase and tends to vanish as the asset price becomes extremely high or low.
Our analysis suggests that information eects drive the asymmetry between
block purchases and sales in neutral markets, whilst it does not play any role in
strongly bearish or bullish markets. Thus our model provides a framework for
further empirical analysis of the asymmetry phenomenon.
13Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the proposition for the ask side of market. The proof for the bid
side is similar. The function ne
 () 
(1 )(1 )
(+(1 )) , dened for all  2 [0;1], is a
positive concave function equal to zero for  equal to 0 and 1 and with maximum




). Thus, if AC(QL) is low enough, there are only
two points into [0;1], ;S and ;S, such that ne
 (;S) = ne
 (;S) = AC(QL)
and ne
 ()  AC(QL) i  2 [0;;S] [ [;S;1]. This concludes the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
Since  < 1 < , ne
 () < ne
 () if and only if  > 1=2 and argmaxne
 () <
1=2 < argmaxne
 (). Thus, from the concavity of ;S() it follows that either
;S < ;S < 1=2 < ;S < ;S
or
;S < ;S < 1=2 < ;S < ;S;
depending on the magnitude of AC(QL). 2
Proof of Lemma 1







BQL)(+(1 )), dened for all  2 [0;1],
is a positive concave function equal to zero for  equal to 0 and 1 and with






BQL). Thus, if c(QL)=QL
is low enough, there are only two points into [0;1], ;L and ;L, such that
se
 (;L) = se
 (;L) = c(QL)=QL and se
 ()  c(QL)=QL i  2 [;L;;L].
2
Proof of Proposition 3
Since the expected prot from trading the large quantity of a trader ob-
serving  is strictly negative, a separating equilibrium never prevails when
 2 [0;;L] [ [;L;1]. On the other hand, when  2 [;L;;L] a separat-
ing equilibrium occurs if and only if ()  0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove the proposition, we rst show that se
 ()  se
 () i
 2 [1=2;1] (Step 1) and then, we demonstrate that se
 ()QL   ne
 ()QS 
se
 ()QL   ne
 ()QS i  2 [1=2;1] (Step 2).
14Step 1: se
 ()  se
 () i  2 [1=2;1]. Since signals are symmetric:
se
 () =






 + (1   )se
BQL
 
 + (1   )
 =
=







SQL + (1   )
 
 + (1   )
 = se
 (1   )
This implies that: se
 ()   se
 () = se
 ()   se
 (1   ), which is positive
only if:
 
 + (1   )se
SQL
 





SQL + (1   )
 









that is true only if   1=2 since  > se
SQL > 1.
Step 2: se
 ()QL   ne
 ()QS  se
 ()QL   ne
 ()QS i  2 [1=2;1].

























































since signals are symmetric. This implies that ne
 (1=2)=se





 () > ne
 ()=se
 () for all  > 1=2, since ne
 ()=se
 () is
decreasing in  and  > 1    i  > 1=2.
The proposition follows immediately by combining claims in Step 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 5










15 G(;)  (;)QL   (;1   )QS.
Assume that the market is in a pooling equilibrium and ;NT = ;NT = 0.
The equilibrum strategies of informed traders are  = f1   ;L;;L;0g and
 = f1   ;L;;L;0g such that:
G(;;L) = G(;;L) = c(QL)   c(QS)
Observe that i) @G(;)=@ < 0 for all  and ii) G(;) = G(1   ;).
Hence, ;L > ;L if G(1   ;) > G(;) for all , and ;L < ;L if
G(1   ;) < G(;) for all . In the following we will show that G(1  
;) > G(;) for all  i  > 1=2 and G(1   ;) < G(;) for all  i
 < 1=2. Let dene H(;) 
(;1 )
(;) and notice that:













First observe that, for any , ;L(1   ;) > 
pe
;L(;) i  > 1=2. Indeed,
simple algebraic calculus shows that:




> 0 ,  > 1=2; (6)




(1   )   
 


















 + (1   )(1   )
2 > 0;
because () >  for any , we can conclude that H(;) > H(1   ;) i
 > 1=2 and, then:
QL
QS   H(1   ;) <
QL
QS   H(;) 8  < 1=2
QL
QS   H(1   ;) >
QL
QS   H(;) 8  > 1=2:
By combining this result with (6) and (5), we obtain that G(;) = G(1 ;)
is larger than G(;) i  > 1=2.
This proves the claim for the case ;NT = ;NT = 0. The proof of the
claim for other cases is similar and will be omitted. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
In a at market, both se
 (1=2) = se
 (1=2) and ne
 (1=2) = ne
 (1=2). As a
consequence, SQL(1=2) = 1=BQL(1=2) and J(1=2) = 0.
16Consider now a bullish market. The price impact asymmetry expression can
be written as:
J() =
 (1   )




Notice that J()  0 i   0.
If the separating equilibrium prevails on both sides, the information content
of a large sell is SQL() = se
SQL; the information content of a large purchase
is 1nBQL() = 1=se
BQL = se











which is negative for all  > 1=2.
If the separating equilibrium prevails on the bid side and the pooling equi-
librium prevails on the ask side of the market (from Proposition 4 we know that




@=@BQL =     (1   )(2se
SQL   1) < 0 8;
and se < 0, we have also in this case pse < se < 0.
If the pooling equilibrium prevails on both sides of the market, from Propo-




BQL() for all  > 1=2. Moreover, when
SQL = 1=BQL then  < 0 for all  > 1=2, and @=@BQL < 0. As a conse-
quence, pe < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7
If the separating equilibrium prevails on both sides, the derivative of the










SQL + (1   )
2 





SQL(1   6 + 62)   2(se
SQL   1)22(1   )2
which is negative into a neighborhood of 1=2.
To conclude the proof, observe that in a weak bear market, the probability
to observe a large buy order increases as  decreases, while the probability to
observe a large sell order decreases as  decreases. Since the asset price is an
increasing function of , the dierence in the information content of large buy
and sell orders increases as the asset price goes down. 
17Proof of Proposition 8
Since ne
 ()  ne
 () for all  > 1=2, we have that ;S  ;S. In a strong




, the probability to observe an information
based large sell order is zero and the probability to observe an information based
large buy order decreases as  decreases. 2









, then a separating equilib-
rium always prevails in a market with zero transaction costs.
Proof
By condition 2 it follows that if a separating equilibrium prevails in the ask







( + (1   )se
BQL)  f(): (7)







( + (1   )se
SQL)  f(): (8)
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